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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
GEORGE JOSEPH EHALT' 
Respondent, 
v:s. 
"\VrLSON McCARTHY and HENRY 
SwAN, Trustees of The Denver 
& Rio Grande Western Rail-
road Company, a corporation, 
and THE DENVER AND Rw 
GRANDE wESTERN RAILROAD 
CoMPANY, a corporation, 
Appella11ts. 
Case No. 6496 
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Respondent, an employee of appellants, trustees of 
The Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 
a corporation, and the said corporation (all of whom will 
be hereinafter referred to as appellants) 41 years of 
age at the time of the happening of the accident, and 
who had been railroading since 1915, was injured while 
engaged in the perf,ormance of his duties as a hostler's 
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helper at Denver, Colo., on F'ebruary 4, 1941. He filed 
suit in the Distri•ct ·Court of the Third .Judicial District 
in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, and follo\\'ing a trial 
before a jury, obtained a verdict and judgment in the 
sum of $20,000.00. 
Appellants' motion for a new trial >vas denied by 
the trial judge, Honorable A. H. Ellett, and following 
the denial of the motion for a new trial, appellants per-
fected an appeal to this Court. 
In the main Uw evidence with respect to the happen-
ing of the accident. iu question was not conflicting. The 
only conflict iu the evidence was in the medical testi-
rhony with respeet to the nature and extent of respond-
ent's injuries, and since appellants do not eomplain of 
the size .of the verdict, that evidence becomes immaterial 
on this appeal. It is not disputed that respondent was, 
in fact, injured ill the performance of his duties a;;; an 
employee of the railroad and that both respondent and 
appellants were engaged in interstate commerce and 
transportation at the time of the accident. It is there-
fore agreed that the remedy afforded respondent is con-
trolled by the provisions of the F'ederal Employers 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 51 and the Federal Boiler 
Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 23, reading as follows: 
"Liabildy of common carriers by railroad, in in-
tersta.te or foreign cmnmerce, for injuries to em-
ployees from negligence; definition of employees. 
FJvery .common carrier by railroad while en-
gaging in commerce between any of the several 
States or Territories, or between any of the States 
and Terri toriet>, or between the District of Colum-
bia and any of the States or Territories, or be-
tween the Distriei of Columbia or any of the 
States or Territories and any foreign nation or 
nations, shall be liable in damages to any person 
suffering injury while he is employed of such car-
rier in such commerce, or, in case of the death 
of such employee, to his or her personal repre-
sentative, for the benefit of the surviving widow 
or husband and children of such employee; and, 
if none, then of such employee's parents; and, 
if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon 
sueh employee, for such injury or death resulting 
.in whole or in part from the negligen\'e of any 
of the officers, agents, or employees of such car-
rier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, 
due to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appli-
ances, machinery, track, roadbecl, works, boats, 
wharves, or other equipment. 
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose 
duties as such employee shall be the furtherance 
of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in 
any way di1'ectly or closely and substantiaHy, af-
fect such commerce as above ,set forth shall, for 
the purposes ·Of this chapter, be eonsidered as 
being employed by such carrier in such com-
merce and shall be <•onsidcred as entitled to the 
benefits of this chapter. Apr. 22, 1908, c. 149, 
Sec. 1, 3'5 Stat. 65; Aug. 11, 1939, e. 685, Sec. 1, 
53 Stat. 1404." 
( 45 U.8.C.A. 51). 
"Use of 1tnsafe locomoti.vcs amd appu.rtcn-
0/IWCS unla·uful; inspcc:tiMI, and tests. It shall be 
unlawful for any carrier to usc or permit to ibe 
used on its line any locomotive unless said loco-
motive, its boiler, tender, and all parts and ap-
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purtenances thereof are in proper condition and 
safe to operate in the service to which the same 
are put, that the same may be employed in the 
active service of sueh carrier without unneces-
sary peril to life or limb, and unless said loco-
motive, its boiler, tender, and all parts and ap-
purtenances thereof have been inspected from 
time to time in accordance with the provisions of 
sections 28, 29, 30, and 32 and are able to with-
stand such test or tests as may be prescribed in 
the rules and regulations hereinafter proYided 
for." 
(45 U.S.C.A. 23). 
The Boiler Inspection Act imposes an absolute duty 
upon appellants to maintain their locomotives and boilers 
in safe ·eondition and gives rise to a duty, for a violation 
of which recovery is permitted under the Federal Em-
ployers Liability Act, 4-:") U . .S.C.A. Section 51 et seq. The 
latter Act imposes upon every common carrier hy rail-
road engaged in interstate emumerce liability in dam-
ages on behalf of any employee whose injuries result in 
whole or in part from the negligence of any officer, agent 
or employee of such carrier or by reason ·Of any defect or 
insufficiency due to its neglig·eme in its track road bed, 
works, etc. A violation of the duty to maintain safe 
boilers imposed by the Boiler Inspection Aet. 
45 U.S.C.A. 23 is negligenee within the meaning of the 
Federal Employers Liability Act, and in the event that 
an employee is injured by reason of a violation of the 
Roiler Inspection Aet, contributory negligence and as-
sumption of risk do not constitute defenses to an action 
br-ought h)' such employc•e. 45 U.S.C.A. 53 and 54. 
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The question for determination by this Court is 
whether or not the evidence, together with the legal pre-
~umptions and legitimate inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom is sufficient to sustain the verdict in respond-
ent's favor. Since the evidence is sufficient, the verdict 
and judgment thereon should be affirmed. (NoTE: All 
transcript references are to official numbering of pages, 
at the bottom of the page.) 
THE FACTS 
A. The Pleadings: 
The complaint ( Tr. 1, et seq.) charged an injury to 
respondent incurred as a result of a boiler explosion on 
February 4, 1941, on locomotive #1804 owned and oper-
ated by appellants. The negligence so charged is as 
follows: 
"5. That the said defendants and each and 
all of them were careless, reckless and negligent 
at said time and place in the operation and main-
tenance of said locomotive No. 1804 in the follow-
ing particulars: 
A. That at said time and place the defend-
ants, acting through their agents, servants and 
employees, other than the plaintiff herein, so care-
lessly and negligently maintained, controlled and 
operated said locomotive No. 1804 that it was 
caused to and did explode and blow up causing 
plaintiff to suffer the injuries as herein set forth. 
B. That at said time and place the defend-
ants herein, acting through their ag·ents, servants 
and employees other than the plaintiff herein, 
6 
required plaintiff to use and operate a locomotive, 
to-wit, No. 1804, which was not in proper condition 
and which was then and there unsafe to use or 
operate in the service to which it was assigned, 
and that said locomotive could not then and there 
be operated or used without unnecessary peril to 
life and limb, as a result whereof said engine 
did explode and blow up as herein set forth, caus-
ing plaintiff to suffer damages as hereinafter com-
plained of. 
C. That at said time and place the defend-
ants, aeting through their agents, servants and 
emplDyees, other than the plaintiff herein, re-
quired and requested the plaintiff to operate said 
locomotive No. 1804 as hereinabove set forth when 
the water level in the boiler of said locomotive 
was approximately thirty-six inches below the 
top of the crown sheet, as a result whereof the 
said boiler did explode and blow up, causing plain-
tiff to suffer the damages as herein set forth. 
D. That the defendants, acting through their 
agents, servants and employees, requested the 
plaintiff to drive and operate a locomotive as 
herein set forth at a time when the crown sheet 
of said locomotive was overheated due to low 
water, as a result whereof said locomotive ex-
ploded and blew up, causing plaintiff to suffer 
the injury and damage herein complained of. 
6. That the aforesaid negligent, careless, 
heedless and reckless conduct on the part of the 
defendants, in the use, maintenance, management 
and operation of said locomotive No. 1804 was 
and is the direct and proximate cause of the injury 
and damage suffered by plaintiff as hereinafter set 
forth." · 
(Tr. p. 2-3) 
The answer admits the explosion and resulting in-
juries and leaves for determination by the Court, the 
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question· as to how or in what manner the explosion 
occurred and whether or not appellants are liable for the 
resulting damages. 
B. The Locomotive: 
The instrumentality causing the injury was steam 
passenger locomotive No. 1804 owned and operated by 
appellants. 
It is conceded that the boiler on this locomotive 
exploded by reason of the fact that the locomotive was 
being operated without a sufficient amount of water in 
the boiler. (Answor-Tr. 7) The amount of water in the 
boiler at the time of the happening of the accident and 
at all times prior thereto was established without dis-
pute by expert testimony to be hereinafter specifically 
referred to. Preliminarily a brief description of the loco-
motive will be of aid to the Court. The main portion of 
a locomotive is, of course, its boiler, which is nothing 
more nor less than a large tank of water. [n the rear 
and lower portion of the boiler is the fire box. It can 
best be visualized by imagining a barrel of water con-
taining a wooden fruit box, divided into two compart-
ments, placed upside down at the bottom of the barrel. 
The box is entirely surrounded by water and the fire, 
which heats the water and causes it to vaporize, is con-
tained in the rear portion of the box. The front com-
partment of the box is an empty chamber through which 
the gas resulting frrom combustion passes. It is known 
as the combustion chamber. The top of the box is the 
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crown sheet. The front of the crown sheet is 6% inches 
higher than the rear. (Tr. 165) The sides of the box 
are called the side sheets; the end nearest the cab, the 
door sheet; the hollow partition separating the fire box 
proper and the c.ombustion chamber, the throat sheet; 
and the end of the box toward the front of the locomo-
tive is called the flue sheet; at the bottom, the box is 
bolted to a piece ·of steel known as the mud ring. (Tr. 
221 to 223) Pipes, known as flues, run from the flue 
·sheet through the boiler and into a compartment under 
the stack known as the smoke compartment. As the fire 
burns in the fire box, the gases produced by combustion 
pass through the chamber, then through the flue sheet 
into the flues and into the smoke c.ompartment. The 
gases heat the sides of the fire box, combustion chamber, 
and flues and since their surfaces are covered with water 
in the boiler, heat is transmitted to the water {~onverting 
it into steam. The steam is drawn from the steam dome 
on top of the boiler down into the pistons, connected to 
the driving wheels. Engine No. 1804 was constructed 
with 57-2Ih inch and 220-3¥2 inch flues, 21 feet in length. 
(Tr. 164) As the steam is exhausted from the pistons, 
it passes through the smoke compartment and out 
through the stack creating a draft through the fixe box, 
flues, and stack. ·when the engine is not actually oper-
ating, a blower supplies this draft. 
In the particular 1ocomotive in question the fire box, 
excluding the combustion chamber, was 1501fH inches in 
length, and 10214 inches in width, and the combustion 
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chamber was 72 inches in length. (Tr. 74-75) The fire 
box and combustion chamber were tied into the locomo-
tive and its boiler by crown holts and stay bolts. (Tr. 
165-166) In this particular locomotive, the distance from 
the top of the crown sheet to the top portion of the boiler 
was 24 to 26 inches. (Tr. 516) The distance from the 
top of the crown sheet to the bottom of the fire box was 
48 inches. (Tr. 521) 
When the boiler is filled with water, the fire box is 
entirely surrounder by the water, except at the bottom 
and the door. (Tr. 289) ·water is drawn from the tank 
of the locomotive and into the boiler by means of two 
inspirators or by a pump. (Tr. 395-396) 
Locomotive No. 1804 was equipped with what is 
known as three Thermic syphons. (Tr. 165) These sy-
phons operate on the same principle as the coffee per-
colator in use in all homes. As water is heated it rises. 
One of these syphons is loc·ated in the combustion cham-
ber. The two other syphons are located in the fire box. 
The syphons are eonnected t.o the bottom of the boiler 
and pick up the water at the point of lowest temperature. 
As the water is heated and rises, it rises in the syphon, 
as in the coffee percolator, and is thrown over the crown 
sheet or top of tl1e fire hox, up toward the top of the 
boiler. 
Just as long as the metal sides and crown sheet of 
the fire box and eomhustion ehamber are covered with 
water, the temperature of the metal will not rise above 
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the temperature of the water surrounding it. However, as 
soon as the metal is exposed to the fire withou't the water, 
j t will quickly overheat. The temperature in the fire box is 
1250° to 1300° Fahrenheit. After the bare metal has 
been exposed to this temperature for about 20 minutes, 
it will thin ont to the point where it will break. (Tr. 
185-194) \Yheu the metal breaks, the water in the boiler 
and the air and gas from the fire box come into contact 
and the \Vater in the boiler is instantly converted into 
steam. When this oeeurs there is a boiler explosion. 
It \vas stipulated at the trial that at the time of the 
explosion, the water in the boiler was 36 inches below 
the top of the crown sheet. (Tr. 165) At the time re-
spondent boarded the engine, the water level was already 
at a point approximately 27 inches below the top of the 
crown sheet. 
The loeomotive rs equipped with devices by whieh 
the operators of the locomotive can determine the height 
of the water in the boiler. These devices are a water 
glass and a water column. Directly in front of the 
fireman's seat on the left side of the engine, there is a 
water glass and water column and there is a water glass 
and water column on the right side of the locomotive 
in front of the engineer's seat. (Tr. 132) The water 
column is a metal column or pipe conneeted to the top 
and bottom of the boiler. Since water seeks its own 
level, the water level in this column is the same as the 
water level in the boiler. (Tr. 290 et seq.-Tr. 230) The 
column has attached to it, three blow off cocks by which 
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the operators of the engine can determine the height of 
the water in the boiler. (Tr. 140) The lowest blow off 
cock is 31;2 inches above the highest point of the crown 
sheet. (Tr. 228-229-230) When these cocks are opened, 
if the water level in the boiler is above the height of 
the cock, water will come out of the cock, making a solid 
sound; if the water is below the level of the cock, the 
cock will emit steam, making a hissing sound. (Tr. 238-
239) In any event, both by eye and ear, the height of the 
water level in the boiler can be determined by the opera-
tion of these cocks, if they arc in proper operating con-
dition. (Tr. 139-140-141) The water glass is a glass 7 
inches high suspended in a vertical position at the rear 
end of the boiler and connected t.o the top and bottom 
of the boiler. (Tr. 231-232) 
The lowest visible part of this glass is 31;2 inches 
above the highest point of the crown sheet. (Tr. 153-321) 
The glass also operates on the principle that water will 
seek its own level. There are valves at the top and 
bottom .of the glass by which its connection with the 
boiler can be shut off and in addition there is a drain 
eock at the bottom of the glass. \Vhen the top and 
bottom valves are open the water level in the glass will 
be the same as the water level in the boiler. (Tr. 236) 
An absolute test of the level of the water in the boiler can 
be made by .opening the drain cock at the bottom of the 
water glass while both the top and bottom valves are 
open, allowing the glass to empty, and then, after closing 
the drain cock, observing the height of the water in the 
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glass as the glass fills. (Tr. 234 to 237) If the water 
glass is full of water showing that the water level in 
the boiler is at the top of the water glass, the boiler 
will contain 976 gallons of water from the top to the 
bottom of the water glass, a distance of 7 inches; (Tr. 
330) from the bottom of the water glass to the top of the 
crown sheet, a distance of 3¥2 inches, the boiler will 
contain 564 gallons (Tr. 330) and from that point to a 
point 36 inches below the highest point on the crown 
sheet, the boiler will contain 3160 gallons of water. ('rr. 
331) These capacities are very material. 
The diagrams and exhibits introduced m evidence 
graphically portray the construction of the boiler, fire 
box, and parts and appurtenances of the locomotive in 
question more clearly than any language used by counsel. 
vVe most respectfully invite examination of the exhibits 
introduced, all of which have to do with the manner of 
the happening of the accident and the construction of 
the locomotive, boiler and fire box. 
C. The Accident: 
Respondent was employed by appellants as a hostler's 
helpe.r, working under the supervision of Chancie M. 
Babcock, hostler. (Tr. 237-349) It is the duty of a hostler 
to prepare engines for use on the road; he removes the 
engines from the round house and with the assistance of 
his helper, fills the engines with coal, water and sand. 
Passenger engines are delivered by him to the passenger 
depot and taken by him from the dep.ot to the round 
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house. (Tr. 468-469) The roundhouse was at Burnham, 
some two miles from the depot. (Tr. 343) 
A hostler's primary duty is to operate the locomo-
tive. He, in effect, is the engineer and if he sees fit he 
need do nothing more than .operate the engine. (Tr. 130) 
A hostler's helper is a combination switchman and 
fireman. (Tr. 130) It is his duty to remove the chains 
from the wheels on engines in the round house, by which 
they are kept from moving, to open the roundhouse doors, 
to put coal, water and sand into locomotives and tenders 
to set switches, and in general to do all of the heavy 
work connected with the operation of the locomotive 
while it is in ·charge of the hostler. (Tr. 339 to 343) The 
hostler is ''the boss'' and gives his helper instructions. 
(Tr. 345-346) It is usual for the hostler to allow his 
helper to operate the engines on occasions. The hostler's 
helper has no right .or authority to operate engines ex-
cept under tlle instructions of the hostler. (Tr. 347-348) 
Due to a contract of appeHants with the railroad brother-
hoods and railroad unions, it is impossible for a hostler's 
helper to become a hostler. (Tr. 258) 
Since the hostler is in charge of the engine, it is his 
primary and absolute duty to at all times s.ee that the 
water in the boiler of the locomotive is at a safe level. 
(Tr. 102-122-143-226) If water cannot be seen in the 
water glass, i. e., if the water is less than 3% inches above 
the highest point on the crown sheet, the. engine. is unsafe 
and unfit to operate. ( Tr. 226-227-228-248-291) 
I I, 
14 
At 12 :BO A . .M. •on February 4, 1941, Babcock the 
hostler, and respondent went to work at Burnham, Colo-
rado. (Tr. 100) Their first duty was to prepare three 
switch engines for operation over the railroad and to 
deliver these three switch engines to the yard of appel-
lants. These three engines were prepared and delivered 
in accordance with routine. (Tr. 101-351) 
At 6 :30 A. M. train No. 20, consisting of 5 cars and 
engine No. 1207 arrived at the Denver depot of appel-
lants headed south. (Tr. ~i52) 
At 7:15 A. M., train No. 16 consisting of an undis-
closed number of {'Oaches and engine No. 1804 arrived at 
the same depot, headed north. (Tr. 354) 
It was the duty of Babcock and respondent to take 
train N10. 20 and engine No. 1804 to the roundhouse at 
Burnham. 
After train No. 20 arrived in the depot at 6 :30 A. M., 
respondent hoarded the train and sat down in the rear 
car of the train. (Tr. 352) Babcock, as was his duty, 
boarded engine No. 1207 and determined that it had a 
proper and appropriate supply of water in its boiler. 
(Tr. 101) 
At 7 :15 A. M. when train No. 16 pulled by engine 
No. 1804 arrived, Babcock immediately boarded engine 
No. 1804. (Tr. 101) In spite ·of the fact that it was his 
duty to ·Check the water level in the boiler at that time, 
he testified that he failed to do so. (Tr. 117-122-138) At 
the trial, appellants did not call the engineer or fireman 
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who were in charge of engine No. 1804, when it arrived 
at the station as witnesses, and there is no evidence in 
the record respecting the level of the water in the water 
glass in engine No. 1804 when it arrived at the station 
or respecting the question as to whether or not the water 
glasses and water eol umns or engine No. 1804 were in 
proper working condition. (Tr. 145) Babcock sat in 
engine No. 1804 alone for lil minutes and at 7:28 A. M. 
responclent boarded the engine. (Tr. :356) As he boarded 
the engine, he found Babcoc-k sitting on the left or fire-
man's seat. Babcock said to him "0. K. let her go." ( Tr. 
105-185) Both men understood by this that respondent 
was to drive the engine. (Tr. 158) Respondent was under 
no duty to observe the water level or to check the water 
level and he did not do so. He assumed that this duty 
had been performed by Babcock. (Tr. 423-424) 
The evidence without dispute established the fact 
that at the time respondent boarded the engine, the water 
level was 27 inches below the top of the crown sheet, and 
the locomotive had therefore been in an unsafe condition 
for a very substantial period >Of time. (Post this brief) 
At the very moment respondent boarded the engine, if 
the water level had been properly determined, it would 
have been the duty of all parties to immediately put out 
the fire in the locomotive and leave it as fast as possible, 
as it was the then immediate danger of blowing up. It 
was then unsafe to inject water into the boiler. (Tr. 
455) Therefore at the time respondent boarded this 
locomotive and was told that it was O.K. and that he 
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should run it, it was in an unsafe and dangerous condi-
tion, and unfit to be operated. 
Babcock intended to attach loc.omotive No. 1804 to 
the front end of train No. 20 pulled by engine No. 1207. 
Thereafter engine No. 1804 was to pull train No. 20 and 
engine No. 1207 south from the station to Burnham. A 
movement over various tracks c.onsuming about 15 min-
utes was necessary to make this coupling and thereafter 
engine No. 1804, still facing north was coupled to the 
front end of engine No. 1207 facing south. (':er. 359-360) 
Approximately five minutes were consumed at the 
station (Tr. 430-431) and at 7 :45 A. M. after the Burling-
ton Zephyr had arrived at the stati.on, engine No. 1804 
driven by respondent started backing south, pulling en-
gine No. 1207 and five cars. (Tr. 438) At that time 
Babcock was still sitting in the fireman's seat. (Tr. 437) 
He was in charge of the operation of this locomotive and 
had in front of his eyes a water glass and water column. 
Since the locomotive was backing, it was necessary f,or 
respondent to look to the rear of the locomotive and he 
therefore had his back to the water glass and water 
column on the engineer's side of the locomotive. (Tr. 
437) At about 15th Street, the men observed that the 
air brakes on engine No. 1207 were "sticking". Bab-
cock therefore got off engine No. 1804 to release the 
brakes on No. 1207 were "sticking". Babcock there-
fore g.ot off engine No. 1804 to release the brakes on No. 
1207 and from then on respondent was alone in No. 1804. 
(rrr. 437-440) Thereafter respondent looked into the fire 
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box ·On No. 1804 and observed that the fire was low and 
that it was dry. By operating the mechanical stoker re-
spondent put a small amount of coal on the fire. (Tr. 441) 
The throttle on No. 1804 was open and the steam was 
being exhausted through the stack. (Tr. 444) At about 
14th Avenue respondent closed the throttle .on No. 1804 
and went over to the gant,YWay to get off and throw a 
switch. (Tr. 444) Babcock was then in the cab of engine 
No. 1207. (Tr. 366) Before respondent dismounted 
from the engine cab he observed that the switches were 
set. He climbed back into the cab, and as he put his 
hand on the thr.ottle to again open it, the explosion 
occurred. (Tr. 366) It was then 7:53 A. M., 8 minutes 
after the engine and train had left the Denver station 
and 38 minutes after it had arrived at said station. (Tr. 
445) Respondent was thrown against the back of the 
tender of the locomotive and then off of the engine. (Tr. 
366) Three of the vertebrae of his back were broken and 
he sustained a severe injury to his chest. He was in 
the hospital f.or several months and at the time of the 
trial was wearing a steel brace and was completely 
incapacitated. (Tr. 367 to 383) 
The boiler on engine No. 1804 was thrown backwards 
over locomotive No. 1207, finally landing on top of the 
tender and passenger car immediately back of engine 
No. 1207. It then rolled .on to the ground and came 
to rest. The fire box was blown apart, but the frame and 
wheels of No. 1804 remained on the rails. (Tr. 164) 
1\ 
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From the Denver Station to Burnham the tracks are 
at first level and then rise at a grade of 1-1!10ths'}'o. (Tr. 
98) The engine had covered approximately 1% miles 
from the Station to the point Df the explosion. (Tr. 98) 
D. The Witnesses: 
Excluding the medical testimony, respondent proved 
his case by his own testimony, and the testimony of 
Babcock, the hostler. 
RALPH W. PA.H:CEL, metalurgist, employed by ap-
pellants, testified respecting the condition of the fire box 
after the happening ,of the accident . 
.B~RANK DIVISEK identified various exhibits m-
troduced in evidence. 
A. L. HI;JAL1D, road foreman of equipment for 
appellants, testified respecting the equipment on the 
locomotive in question and its proper operation, and 
further testified respecting tests made with engine No. 
1801 and five cars. T·his engine and cars were run in 
exactly the same manner and over the same route as 
the r.oute taken by engine No. 1804 on the day of the 
happening of the accident and measurements of the 
amount of water used on the trial run established the 
amount of water used by No. 1804. 
\V. J. KIRSCH, retired master mechanic of the 
Union Pacifie Railroad explained the construction of the 
fire box and the operation of the engine. 
Other than medical testimony, appellants produced 
the testimony of W. H. SAGSTETTER, chief mechanical 
oHicer or appellants. He testified concerning the con-
struction of the locomotive in question and tests made on 
a 1/,-.; scale model of the fire box and boiler. 
T. E. GR1E,EN testified with respect to a purported 
<'mlversation he had with respondent. 
Appellants failed to produce any further testimony. 
They did not produce the testimony of the engineer and 
Jireman in eharge of engine No. 1804 when it arrived 
at the Denver Station. These witnesses were employees 
of appellants and their failure to produce this testimony 
under familiar rnles, gives rise to the presumption that 
it would be adverse. It is undisputed that the water 
level in the locomotive at the time of arrival at Denver 
Station was far below the top of the erown sheet and 
that the locomotive at that time was in an unsafe and 
exceedingly dangerous condition. This condition oould 
arise only by virtue of the failure of the engineer and 
fireman to maintain the water in the boiler at a proper 
level or because of the failure of the testing devices on 
the locomotive to properly advise these men that the 
water in the boiler was at an unsafe level. The verry 
moment respondent boarded this locomotive, the crown 
sheet, and other parts and appurtenances of the boiler 
were in an exceedingly dangerous condition. Water 
could not be added to the boiler with safety and the 
loc.omotive could not he operated with any degree of 
safety whatsoever. 
~I~ ,. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. 
Assuming that the sole cause of the explosion was 
the failure of the engineer and fireman of engine No. 
1804 and of Babcock, the hostler, to inje{•t water into 
the boiier, respondent establisrhed a violation of the Boil-
er Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C.A. Section 23. 
II. 
The evidence, together with legitimate inferences, 
proves that locomotive No. 1804 was mechanically defec-
tive and unsafe and that the cause of the happening of 
the aecident in question was such defeet. 
III. 
'The violation of the Boiler Inspection Aet was the 
proximate cause of the accident and of the injuries to 
respondent. 
IV. 
There was no error in the instructions to the .Jury. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Assuming that the sole cause of the explosion was the fail-
ure of the engineer and fireman of engine No. 1804 
and of Babcock, the hostler, to inject water into the 
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boiler, respondent established a violation of the Boiler 
Inspection Act, 45 U .S.C.A. Section 23. 
Appellants argument proceeds as follows: 
Although it is undisputed that the boiler on engine 
No. 1804 exploded and that respondent sustained injuries 
as a result of the explosion, and although the evidence 
discloses that the "\Vater in the boiler on engine No. 1804, 
when respondent boarded the locomotive, was below the 
crown sheet, and that the locomotive was therefore in 
a dangerous and unsafe condition, this condition could 
have occurred either by reason of the negligence of the 
employees of appellants or by reason of some defect in 
the locomotive. In the absence of any evidence of a de-
fect in the locomotive, it must be presumed that the loco-
motive was in fit and proper condition and that the neg-
ligence of appellants' employees caused the dangerous 
and unsafe condition. Although this negligence gives 
rise to the cause of action created under the Federal 
Employers Liability Act, 45 U.KC.A. 51 for negligence, 
the condition of the boiler on the locomotive resulting 
from such negligence is not a violation of the F'ederal 
Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.1S.C.A. 23. In order to es-
tablish a violation of the Fodera[ Boiler Inspection Act, 
the evidence must disclose a mechanical defect in the 
locomotive and since there is no evidence of a mechancrial 
defect in this regard and since the cause was submitted 
upon the issue of a viol,ation of the Boiler Inspection Act, 
judgment in favor of respondent must be reversed. 
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It appears to us that appellants are laboring under 
a grave misapprehension of law and fact in two important 
and material respects. They contend (1) that violations 
of the Boiler Inspection Act are limited to situations in-
volving mechanical defeets and insufficiencies in loco-
motives, their boilers and appurtenances unrelated to the 
results of negligence in the operation of such equipment; 
and (2) that there was no mechanical defect or insuf-
ficiency in the locomotive in question or in its boiler or 
other appurtenances at the time it was placed under the 
control of Ehalt. 
Certainly Congress did not intend to legislate in the 
field of mechanics when it passed the Boiler Inspection 
Act. A reading of t;he Act clearly reveals a le~islative in-
tent to accomplish a much greater and more important 
purpose, viz, to shield and protect engineers, firemen, 
hostlers, hostler's helpers and other employees from un-
necessary exposure to danger in their employment. By 
the Act Congress unconditionally required the railroad 
companies to use safe locomotives but left the means of 
accomplishing this requirement entirely to them. 
The title of the Act is suggestive. "Use of Unsafe 
Locomotives and Appu.rtena'l'lces Unlawf·ul; Inspection 
and Tests." The lanf,'11age of the Act indicates that the 
purpose of Congress was to legislate in the field of safety, 
and that alone. We quote : 
''It shall be unlawful for any carrier to use, 
or permit to be used, on its line, any locomotive 
unless said locom01tive, its boiler, its tender and 
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all parts and appurten<mces thereof, are in proper 
condition and safe to operate in the service to 
which the same are put, that the sante may be em-
ployed in the active service of such car,rier with-
out un~Ytecessary peril to life or limb. * * * '' 
The contention that the purpose of Congress was to 
require nothing more than mechanical efficiency, is to do 
violence to the express terms of the Act. The purpose 
of the Act has never been and should not be so limited 
and stultified by construction. 
It has been held from the first by the Federal Courts 
that the Act should be liberally eonstrued and its obvious 
purpose effedua ted. Hines v. Smith, (C. C. A.) Ill. 1921, 
275 Fed. 766. 
'l'he first contention advanced by appellants is not 
novel. It was advanced and refuted by the Supreme 
Court of the United Stutes in the leading case on this 
subject, Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Groeger, (Ohio) 12.5, 
45 S. Ot. 16'9, 266 U. S. 521, 69 L. Ed. 419. The plaintiff 
in that case sued as the administratrix of her deceased's 
husband's estate. He was killed in a boiler explosion ac-
cident. !She based her claim for judgment, in part, upon 
the ground that the defendant railroad company required 
deceased to operate an unsafe locomotive, in that its 
boiler was not equipped with fusible plugs. 
The trial Court submitted the case to the jury upon 
that issue, among others. The jury found for the plain-
tiff. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 
the judgment, and the matter was then taken to the Su-
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preme Court. T·he Supreme Court in a very intelligent 
and enlightening opinion, and one that has never been 
questioned since, refuted the proposition that Congress 
intended to legislate in the field of me·chanics, and held 
that the intent and purpose of Congress was to place 
upon the railroads the absolute continuing duty of pro-
viding and using safe locomotives. That the means of 
meeting this requirement was left entirely in their hands. 
The Court stated: 
·"By the last mentioned section (Boiler In-
spection Act) defendant was bound absolutely to 
furnish what before, under the common law, it 
was its duty to exercise ordinary care to provide. 
The carriers were left free to determine how the 
boilers should be kept in proper condition for use 
without unnecessary danger. The things required 
for that purpose were not prescribed or changed 
by the Act; but use of boilers, unsafe to operate, 
as specified, >vas made unlawful, and liability for 
consequences follows violation of the act." 
It seems to be applicants' contention that the safety 
factor of locomotives and boilers can be entirely disre-
garded as far as the Act is concerned, even though crown 
sheets hec·ome exposed, or other conditions of peril 
and danger arise, so long as the dangerous condit~ons, 
whatever they may be, are due to the negligence of the 
operators, and are not a ttri bn table to so-called mechanical 
defects. 
Carried to its logical conclusion appellant's position 
1s to the effect that the application of the Act depends 
upon the answer to the question, "was the dangerous 
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condition caused by negligence or by so-called me-
chanical defects~" If negligent opei;ation of the 
equipment results in the unsafe and dangerous con-
dition, appellants would then maintain that the Act ha,s 
not been violated for the reason that "to constitute a 
violation of the Act there must be evidence of some 
mechanical defect or insufficiency in the locomotive, its 
boiler, tender or parts or appurtenances," separate and 
apart from the results of negligent usage. Suc:h a posi-
tion, it is submitted, completely ignows the conclusively 
established fact that mechanical defects and insufficien-
cies in maehinery result from usage, negligent or other-
wise, perhaps more frequently than from faulty or im-
proper eonstruction. 
Under the "Act" there can be no reasonable justi-
fication for a distincltion between conditions of unsafety 
and danger in locomotives, their boilers, tenders and 
other appurtenances, caus!Yd by the negligent use and 
operation of the equipment and similar conditions other-
wise caused, or resulting from mechanical defects or in-
sufficiencies. 
A diligent seareh of the authorities has failed to 
reveal any single decision which supports such a con-
tention or such a distinction. vVe believe that no such 
decision can be found. 
The argument that an unsafe condition due to neg-
ligence does not violate the Boiler Inspection Adt is nega-
tively answered in Great Northern Raihvay Company v. 
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Donaldson, 62 L. Ed. 121, where the Supreme Court of 
the Unitetl States approved the following instruction 
given to the jury: 
''Therefore, if you shall believe from a fair 
preponderance of all the evidence in the case that 
the boiler of the locomotive Engine No. 1902, or 
the appurtenances thereof, were not in proper con-
dition and safe to operate in the active service of 
the defendant in moving traffic without unneces-
sary peril to life and limb by reason of the negli-
gence of the defendant in any one or more of the 
three respects alleged in the complaint, then and 
in that case, Vance H. Thomas assume no risk of 
death and was guilty of no contributory negli-
gence, and the affirmative defenses must fail." 
Locomotive 1804 was not only dangerous and unsafe 
but was mechanically defeetive at the time it was placed 
under the control of Ehalt. 
Appellants insist that there was no mechanieal defect 
or insufficiency in Loeomoti ve 1804 at the time it was 
placed under the control of Ehalt and prior to its ex-
plosion because (1) the crown sheet is not, mechanically 
speaking, a part of the locomotive, and is not in any sense 
of the term a mechanical device; and ('2) the exposure of 
the crown sheet and its subsequent failure was not the 
failure of a mechanical device and did not amount to or 
cause a meehanical defect or insufficiency in the locomo-
tive. 
We submit that such contention with respect to the 
meaning and application of the phrase "mechanical de-
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feC:t or insufficiency" 1s inaccura to, narrow and re-
stricted. 
When Congress enacted the so-called Boiler Inspec-
tion Act it had in mind locomotives in active service. It 
was not thinking of cold engines on storage tracks or in 
round houses. It contemplated locomotives with fire in 
their fire boxes, water in their boilers and steam in the 
cylinders and steam domes; live locomotives; locomotives 
in a condition to be used in the transporation of com-
merce. The crown sheet is an integral part of such lo-
comotive. It is a necessary part of the locomotive 
mechanism. The crown sheet performs an essential 
function in the productio.n of power and in the opera-
tion of the engine. If the crown sheet fails, not only 
does the locomotive fail, but it explodes, and it was the 
crown sheet which failed in this case, and its failure re-
sulted in explosion and destruction of the locomotive. 
The failure of the crown sheet was in fact a failure of a 
mechanical device. It w:as a failure of a part of the 
mechanical structure of the locomotive. The evidence 
establishes without doubt that at and prior to the time of 
the explosion there wa,s a very serious mechanical defect 
in the locomotive in question-an exposed crown sheet, 
a crown sheet unprotected by water. It is most difficult 
to conceive of a locomotive in service more unsafe or 
dangerous or more mechanically defective. 
Appellants' argument that the locomotive was not 
mechanically defective at and prior to the time of ex-
plosion is unsupported by the evidence, and is contrary to 
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reason. The locomotive may have been free from me-
chanical defects hours before when it was deEvered to the 
ent,rineer and fireman, who in turn delivered it to hostler 
Babcock, but it certainly was not in a safe condition when 
Babcock delivered it to Ehalt. At that time its crown sheet 
was exposed. Its water level was at least 27 inches below 
the top of the crown sheet. It was in a dangerous and un-
safe condition, and the Act uncondit,ionally required the 
defendants, acting through Babcock, to deliver to Ehalt 
a safe locomotive, one which could be used and operated 
in the condition in which it was delivered in safety and 
without unnecessary peril. 
There can be no doubt but what the Aet was violated 
by the defendants when the locomotive in its dangerous 
and unsafe condition was delivered to Ehalt. The Groeger 
case, supra, supports this contention. We quote: 
"The Court in harmony with the p1·ovisions 
of paragraph (2) instructed the jury that the 
standard of defendant's duty vvas to put and keep 
the locomotive in proper condition and safe to 
operate, and that it would be a violation of de-
fendant's duty if the engine, as to the crown sheet, 
was permitted to be in such a condition that it 
eould not be employed iu the active service of the 
carrier moving the traffic without unnece.ssary 
peril to life and limb.'' 
Supposing that a~~ a resnlt of exposure the crown 
sheet in a locomotive \Yas i1Jjured, damaged and weak-
ened, but that no explosion occurred; that thereafter the 
locomotive \\'as again placed in service and as a result of 
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the weakened and damaged oondition of the crown sheet 
it failed in service and an explosion occurred to the in-
jury of the operator. Could it be successfully contended 
that the Act had not been violated? Such contention 
would certainly be without merit, and we believe all 
Courts would say without hesitation that the railroad 
company violated the express provisions of the Act by 
using and placing in operation an unsafe and dangerous 
locomotive. Is the violation of the Act in the case stated 
more certain than in the case at bar~ The only support 
for an affirmative contention is that the defendant in 
the case stated is chargeable with notice of the dangerous 
and unsafe condition of the locomotive at the time it was 
placed in service following the exposure of the crown 
sheet, while here they perhaps are not, but this distinc-
tion is without merit under the authorities. The Court 
in the Groeger case stat,ed: 
"Defendant's .duty to have the boiler in a safe 
condition to operate so that it could be used with-
out unnecessary peril to its employees was ab-
solute and continuing. No notice to the defendant, 
actual or constructive of the defects or unsafe con-
ditions of the boiler was necessary to plaintiff's 
cas1e. Defendant is liable if its breach of duty con-
tributed to cause the death.'' 
The opinion in the case of Lehigh Valley Railroad 
Company v. Beltz, (C. C. A. 2) 1925, 10 Fed. (2d) 74, Cert. 
denied 46 S. Ct. 205, 270 U.S. 641, 70 L. Ed. 775, supports 
our argument. Plaintiff's decedent was employed by the 
defendant as a conductor. He was riding in the cab of 
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one of defendant's engines when the main pin broke 
causing the driving and parallel rods to fly about, disabl-
ing the engine and punching a hole in the boiler, causing 
a violent emission of steam, hot water and coals of fire 
into the cab. Decedent jumpeu in an effort to save his 
life, but was fatally injured. 
Defendant based its defm1se upon the lack of any 
proof of negligence on its part whatsoever. F'rom the 
opinion we quote as follows: 
"fn St. Louis Iron l'vlouutnin & Southern Ry. 
Co. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281, 295, 2S S. Ct. 616, 621 
(52 L. E'd. 1061), the Supreme Court, commenting 
on the Saf1ety Appliame Acts, deelared: 
'" 'In the ease before us the liability of the 
defendant does not grow out of the eommon-lav.· 
duty of master to servant. The Congress, not 
satisfied with the common-law dutv and its re-
sulting liability, has pr1escribed nnd defined the 
duty by statute. We have nothing to do but to 
ascertain and declare the meaning of a few simple 
words in which the duty is described. It is en-
acted that "no cars, either loaued or unloaded, 
shall be used in interstate traffic whieh do not 
comply with the standard." Thore is no esea.pe 
from the meaning of these words. "B~xplanation 
cannot clarify them, and ought not to be employod 
to confuse them or lossen their significance. The 
obvious purpose of the Congress was to supplant 
the qualified duty of the common law with an ab-
solute duty deemed by it more just. If the rail-
road does, in point of faet, use cars which do not 
comply with the standard, i't violates the plain 
prohibitions of the law, and there arises from that 
violation the liability to make compensation to one 
who is injured by it. It is urged that thi's is a 
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harsh construction. To this we reply that, if it 
be the true construction, its harshness is no con-
cern of the courts. They have no responsibility 
for the justice or wisdom of legislation, and no 
duty except to enfon~e the law as it is written, 
unless it is clearly beyond the constitutional pow-
er of the 1aw-making body. * • * It is quite 
conceivable that Cong-ress, contemplating the in-
evitable hardship of such injuries, and hoping to 
diminish the economic loss to the community re-
sulting from them, :,;hould deem it wise to impose 
their burdens upon those who could measurably 
control their causes, instead of upon those who 
are in the maiu hcl pless in that regard. Such a 
policy would be intelligible, and, to say the least, 
not so unreasonable as to require us to doubt that 
it was intended, and to seck some unnatural in-
terpretation of common words. \Ve see no error 
in this part of the case.' 
"In Chicago, Burlington & Quincey Railway 
Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 559, 31 S. Ot. 612, 
55 L. Ed. 582, the Supreme Court had the mean-
ing of the Safety Appliance Acts .again before it. 
I~ quoted at length from the Taylor Case, supra. 
Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the court, called 
attention to the fact that in that case the court 
had decided that the acts 'imposed an absolute 
duty' on the carriers, and that that duty could not 
be evaded or excused by proof that the carrier had 
used ordinary care or reasonable diligence. He 
declared that the court was unwi1ling to regard 
the question 'as open to further discussion here. 
If the court was wrong in the Taylor Case, the 
way is open for such .an amendment of the statute 
as Congress may, in its discretion, deem proper.' 
As the court has ever since adhered to its con-
struction of the aots, and Congress has never seen 
fit to modify the construction the court gave them, 
we must conclude that no error was committed 
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and that Congress intended the duty imposed to 
be .absolute. 
"in Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 
U.S. 33, 43, 3,6 S. Ot. 482, 60 L. :BJd. 874, the conrt, 
referring to the Safe'ty Appliance Aet, again de-
clared: 'The question whether the defective con-
dition of the ],adder was due to defendant's neg-
ligence is immaterial, since the statute imposes an 
absolute and unqualified duty to maintain the ap-
pliance in secure condition.' 
"In 1!he recent case of Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road Co. v. Groeger, 266 U. S. 521, 45 S. Ct. 169, 
69 L. Ed. 419, the Supreme Court had occasion to 
pass upon section 2 of the Boiler Inspection Act. 
That was an action brought by an administratrix 
of the estate of her deceased husband to recover 
damages £or his death. At the time of his death 
he was a locomotive engineer, operating a steam 
locomotive propelling an interstate train. He, 
too, was killed by t'he explosion of the boiler. In 
that case, as in this, the administratrix obtained a 
verdict and judgment against the defendant, and 
it was affirmed by the Circuit Curt of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit, 288 F. 321. The ease was take.n 
on certiorari to the Supreme Court, and reversed 
for certain erroneous instructions to the jury to 
which it is not necessary for us to refer at tlbis 
time. But it is important and material that the 
Supreme Court, construing section 2 of the Boil-
er Inspection Act, declared: 'By the last-men-
tioned section defendant was bound absolutely to 
furnish what before, under the common law, it was 
its duty to exercise ordinary care to provide.' 
And the court went on to speak of the defend-
ant's 'duty to have and keep its boilers safe for 
use as required by the act.' It declared: 'No 
notice to the defendant, actual or constructive, of 
the defects or unsafe condition of the boiler, was 
necessary to plaintiff's case.' 
''An 'absolute' duty is one vvhich is not sub-
ject to any limitation or condition. 1t is positive 
and not dependent. It is unqualified by any con-
ditions or considerations whatsoever. If the 
Boiler Inspection Aet imposed on the defendant 
an absolute duty to have the boiler and appurten-
ances thereof safe to operate, and substituted that 
rule for the common-law rule, which holds the 
employer to ordinary care to provide his employ-
ees a reasonably safe place in which, and reasona-
bly safe appliances and machinery with which to 
work, it in effeet makes the employer an insurer 
of the safety of the place in which the employee 
works and of t;he appli'ances with which he works. 
While the duty imposed upon the carrier is ab-
solute, it is not enough that the carrier had failed 
to show that the appJi,ances which it had provided 
were safe.'' 
To the sa.me effeet see Gerow v. Seaboard Airline 
Ry., (N. C.) 128 S. E. 345, Cert. denied 46 S. Ct. 121, 269 
U. S. 584, 70 L. Ed. 425. 
There is no escape from the conclusion that the lo-
comotive in question exploded because of a mechanical 
defect, to-wit, an exposed crown sheet, and that the de-
fendants violated the Boiler Inspection Act by deliver-
ing to Ehalt for use in their service a defective, unsafe 
and dangerous locomotive, a locomotive which could not 
be used in such service without unnecessary peril to the 
operator thereof, and that as a direct and proximate 
result of the violation ·of the Ad by the defendants Ehalt 
reeeived the injuries and damages herein complained of. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that the state 
of the record is such that we must presume that there 
•.~~~. 
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wa.s no mechanical defect in this locomotive and that the 
cause of the unsafe condition of the locomotive was the 
negligence of the engineer and fireman, who brought the 
locomotive into the Denver Station in failing to inject 
sufficient water into the locomotive boiler, nevertheless 
the judgment must he affirmed. 
The Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.RC.A. 2:1 was 
passed for the protection of employees of and passengers 
upon the railroads and imposes an absolute liability upon 
the carrier. If a locomotive is not in proper condition 
and safe to operate in the service to which it is to he 
put so that it may he employed without unnecessary 
peril to life or limb, the carrier is liable for resulting 
injuries. Proof of the violation of the Act, ·without more, 
if the violation proximately causes injury, sustains 
recovery. 
H. & 0. Ry. v. Groeger, supra. 
When respondent boarded the locomotive, the water 
m the boiler was at a point 27 inches below the crown 
3heet. In the tests conducted by the witness Heald with 
engine No. 1801, it was found that the engine used 7~60 
gallons of water to 15th Avenue the point where the ex-
plosion occurred. (Tr. 322-327) When the tests were 
started the water glass was fun of water and at the con-
clusion of the tests approximately 51;2 inches of water 
had been used. (Tr. 327) This represented 760 gallons 
of water, the full length of the water glass representing 
97'6 gallons. (Tr. 330) From the bottom of the water 
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glass to the top of the crown sheet, a distance of 3% 
inches, the boiler held 964 gaUons (Tr. 330) and from 
the top of the crown sheet to a point 3·6 inches below sueh 
point, the tank held 3,160 gallons. err. 331) Since the 
locomotive held 3,160 gallons for this distance of 36 
inches, it held approximately 88 gallons per inch. 
Sinec the locomotive used 760 gallons in the test 
and since at the rate of 88 gallons per inch, 760 gallons 
represented approximately 9 inches, it was demonstrated 
that when respondent boarded the locomotive the water 
was then at a point 27 inches below the crown sheet. Ap-
pellants admitted the water was below the crown sheet 
when respondent "got" the engine. ('Tr. 19:n 
·'rhc faet that the water was :36 inches below 
the highest point on the erowu sheet when the explosion 
occurred was stipulated to, (Tr. 165) and, in addition, 
pictures of the fire box together with the testimony of 
Ralph W. Pan~cl, the metalurgist, proved this to be the 
fact. All witnesses agreed that onte the water could no 
longer be seen in the water glass, the locomotive was in 
a dangerous and unsafe {'Ondition and that water could 
not be added to the boiler until the fire had been dumped 
and the locomotive had been cooled. 
"Q. Yon arc familiar, of course, with engines the 
type of 1804 that's been discussed here iu 
this case? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. With its equipment and with its opcration1 
A. Yes sir. 
I !~ : 
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Q. 
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You are acquainted with the rules and regu-
lations, are you, pertaining to engineers, fire-
men, and hostlers? 
I am. 
I will ask you to state whether or not it's the 
duty under the rules and regulations of the 
engineer and the fireman and hostler to keep 
the water level in that engine when it is un-
der their control at a safe level? 
It is. 
Now, will yon tell the jury and the Court on 
the type of engine that I mentioned what is 
considered and what the rules and regulations 
provide as a safe water level in the boiler'? 
A. The safe water level in the hoiler is never 
below H1e lowest reading of the low ga up;e 
cock or the bottom of the water glass. 
Q. So that any level below, which would indi-
cate that the water was 'below the water glass; 
that is, any level below the water glass or 
the lowest gange cock, is considered an un-
safe level'? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And au engine that had a water level below 
the water glass or the bottom gauge cock 
would he considered a dangerous engine? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Now, I will ask you to state whether or not 
under the rules and regulations of your rail-
mad it's the duty of the engineer ancl the fire-
man and the hostler to keep that water level 
at a safe level at all times when thev are in 
any way responsible for the locom~tive or 
the engine 1? 
A. They are.'' 
(Tr. 225 to 226-A. L. Heald) 
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Q. And, as a matter of fact, is it not true that 
any time the water is below the level of the 
crown sheet in the boiler, that engine is high-
ly dangerous 1 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And not fit to be operated or used? 
* * • * * * * 
A. 'That's right. 
Q. rehat is to say that when the water is below 
the level of the crown sheet the engine is 
highly dangerous and is not fit to operate and 
unsafe? 
A. That's correct." 
(Tr. 249 to 2:50~A. L. Heald) 
"Q. Now, as I understand it, as long as water ap-
pears in these glasses, as long as the water 
appears there, the engine is in a safe operat-
ing condition as far as the water level is con-
cerned. That is true, isn't it? 
A. As long as you can see the water in the glass. 
Q. If there comes a time in the operation of the 
engine when yon can't see the water in the 
glass, what then would you say to be the con-
dition of the engine with respect to safety? 
A. Well, I wouldn't want to be on it. 
Q. Well, would you say whether it was safe or 
unsafe7 
A. Well, of course, a man could try that, he could 
find out. 
Q. I am saying he can't find any water in the 
glass. He tries it and can't find any water 
in either glass. vVhat is the condition of the 
engine with respect to safety(? 
A. She is dangerous. 
3'8 
Q. Is that a dangerous engine 'f 
A. Yes. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Could you operate it and use it safely under 
those conditions 1 
No sir. 
Supposing that the crown sheet, the top por-
tion of the crown sheet is exposed. What 
would you say then with respect to the safety 
of the engine f 
It's unsafe. 
Q. Is it dangerous~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Cou'ld it be used in any service with safetyf 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Would anyone who was-what would you say 
with respect to the safety of any employee 
operating or attempting to operate the en-
gine under those circumstances f 
* * * • * • • 
A. Unsafe. 
Q. Would there be any danger involved in the 
operation and use of any such engine with 
the water level below the crown sheet1 
A. Yes sir." 
(Tr. 291 to 29'2~W .. T. Kirsch) 
'''Q. Now, Mr. Ehalt, from your knowledge that 
you gained in being a locornotive~in working 
in and around locomotives all these years-
if you should determine, if it should come to 
your attention, your knowledge, that the wa-
ter in the !boiler ~was at a point where you 
could not determine where it was; in other 
39 
words, if it was below bottom reading on the 
glass and below bottom reading on the gauge 
cocks and you couldn't tell where that water 
was, you know the only thing to do is to pull 
fire and quit. Isn't that right'? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Because when you can't see the water, there 
isn't any water there, the only thing to do 
is pul'l your fire and let your locomotive cool 
off? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever pull fire under those eircum-
stances? 
A. No. 
Q. Of course, it isn't unusual to pull them, is it'? 
A. No, if they get in a dangerous condition, no. 
Q. You know it is done upon occaswns on any 
railroad 1 
A. Well, I guess, yes. 
Q. Well, all right, you know at least it 1s douc 
on the D. & R. G.? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. When you can't see the water, the thing to 
do is pull your fire and let the lo<'omotive cool 
off? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, you know it might be highly dangerous 
to put water into a boiler if you don't know 
where your water level is? 
A. Yes sir. 
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Q. Because the water IS liable to splash and 
come in contact with those hot plateR and 
cause an immediate shattering"? 
A. Yes sir." 
(Tr. 454 to 455~Respondent) 
Considering the capacities of the boiler at its various 
levels and the fact that the water at the time the loco-
motive was delivered to respondent was 27 inches below 
the top of the crown sheet, any such condition due to the 
negligence of the engineer and fireman of the locomotive 
was more than simple negligence and can only be charac-
te.vized as willful, wanton and criminal negligence. It 
is most difficult to presume that any employee of ap-
pellants of sufficient experience to operate a passenger 
train could be so negligent; but assuming this to be the 
fact, judgment in favor of respondent still must be af-
firmed. 
The Boiler Inspection Act makes it unlawful for a 
common carrier to use a locomotive on its lines, unless 
the locomotive and its boiler are in proper condition and 
safe to operate, so that they may 'be employed in the ac-
tive service of the carrier, without unnecessary peril to 
life or limb. When respondent boarded this locomotive, 
the locomotive and its boiler were in imminent danger of 
exploding by reason of the fact that the cro\vn sheet and 
other parts and appurtenances of the fire box were over-
heated. This condition existed prior to the time that 
respondent boarded the locomotive and was one not 
created by him. It is difficult to conceive of a locomotive 
l 
l 
l 
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in a more unsafe condition than locomotive No. 1804 was, 
when respondent boarded it. A locomotive in imminent 
danger of exploding, is not in proper condition and safe 
to operate. As s.tated in the Groeger case supra, the 
issue in the case of a boiler explosion is not whether or 
not the boiler is equipped with fusib'le plugs (and fusible 
plugs would have prevented this explosion) or with any 
other specific mechanical device, but is whether or not 
the locomotive is safe and in proper condition. In the 
cases cited by appellants, appliances connected to the 
locomotive were mislaid by reason of negligeuc·e, or some 
foreign substance such as coal or grease was placed upon 
a locomotive otherwise efficient. In none of these cases, 
did the article misplaced or the foreign substance pre-
vent the operation of the locomotive over the lines of 
the road ·with safety. Tho ad of rep1lacing the misplaee1d 
appliance or removing the foreign suhstances would have 
immediate!~· left the locomotive in all respects in proper 
condition. 
In tho case at bar, however, the overheated crown 
sheet \Vas a mechanical appliance in a dangerous condi-
tion and the boiler was in imminent danger of exploding. 
The distinction between the ease at bar and the cases 
cited by appellants is c•learly drawn in the opinion of the 
Oircuit Court of Appea1ls, Second Circuit, in Anderson 
u. H. d7 0. By., 89 Fed. (2d) 629. 
"The defendant contends that, since the evi-
dence shows without eontradictiou that the san-
ders worked bo·th before and after the accident, 
their temporary failure could not have been due 
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to any mechanical or functional defect but re-
sulted from the clogging of the sand at the end of 
the pipes because of weather conditions. It was 
a rainy day in July, but the rain was not of un-
usual or extraordinary severi,ty. When the rails 
are wet is the precise time when the sanders are 
needed, and the plaintiff argues persuasively that 
an apparatus which will become clogged so that 
it cannot function during an ordinary summer 
rain does not comply with the rule requiring a 
'proper sanding apparatus, which shall be main-
tained in safe and sui,table condition for service.' 
The engineer testified that the sand is blown by 
air from the box through the pipes; that the flow 
of air is controlled by the operation of valves in 
the engine cab; and that the valves were \vide 
open from t'he time the train left Stanley until it 
stalled. vVe think that the fai1lure of the appar-
atus to function when opera ted in a proper man-
ner and under normal working conditions makes 
a prima facie case of insuffiriency either in the 
air pressure or in mechanical construction. The 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has frequently been 
appl~ed to prove, in the absence of explanation, a 
violation of provisions of the Safety Applianc:e 
Acts (4'5 U.RC.A. See. l et seq.). Sr(' SpokmJC 
& Inland R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U. S. 497, 505 
36 S. Ct. 68:3, 60 L. Ed. 112'5; Minneapolis & St. 
Louis R. Co. v. Gotschal1l, 244 U. S. 66, 67, 37 
S. Ct. 598, 61 L. Ed. 995; Philadelphia & R. Ry. 
Co. v. Eisenhar't, 280 :H'. 271, 275 (C. C. A. 3); 
Didinger v. Pennsylvania R. Go., 39 ]'. (2d) 798, 
799 (C. C. A. 6); Detroit T. & I. H. Co. v. Hahn, 
47 If'. (2d) 59, 60 (C. C. A. 6). The case at bar 
presents a very different situation from that of 
grease on a handhold or ice on the running board, 
as in Ford v. New York, N. H. & H. H. Co., ;)4 
F. (2d) 342 ('C. C. A. 2). No handhold is made 
which may not become smeared with grease from 
greasy hands, and no running bo~ard which will 
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not be-come icy in wet and freezing weather. To 
be subject to tho:se defects in service raises no 
inference of insufficiency of either handhold or 
running board; but a sanding apparatus which 
will not sand on a wet day in summer, when the 
valves are open and the sandboxes filled, is no 
better than none at all. No evidence was present-
ed by the defendant that clogging of the pipes is 
unavoidable in wet weather, even though the ap-
paratus he in perfect order. On the issne of 
violation of the Boiler Inspertion Act and rule 
120 there was evidence enough to go to the .inn·.'' 
Anderson v. B. & 0. R. Co., 
89 Fed. (2d) G29 (C. C. A. ~). 
T1herefore assuming for the purpose of this argu-
ment only that the evidence establishes the freedom of 
the locomotive from mecha.nical defect and that the acci-
dent w:as due to the negligence of the engineer on engine 
No. 1804 in failing to inject sufficient water into the 
boiler, nevertheless judgment in f.avor of respondent 
must be affirmed. 
II. 
The evidence, together with legitimate inferences, proves 
that locomotive No. 1804 was mechanically defective 
and unsafe and that the cause of the happening of the 
accident in question was such defect. 
It is agreed that the boiler on engine No. 1804 ex-
ploded. It is further .fl,greed that the exp[osion resulted 
from the low water in the boiler. Appellants faned to 
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call the engineer and the fireman who brought engine 
No. 1804 into the Denver Station as witnesses. Babcock, 
the hostler, testified that he did not observe the condi-
tion of the water gauge and water column and made no 
tests of the water. ('Tr. 117-122-138) Respondent testi-
fied that he did not observe the water gauge or water 
column. (Tr. 423-424) There is therefore a complete 
absence of evidence respe-cting the condition of the wa-
ter gauges and the water wlumns both before and after 
the accident. There is also no evidence that the inspira-
tor and pump, which delivered "Tater from the tank in 
the tender to the boiler, were in fit and proper candition. 
These devices being mechanical contrivances like any 
other mechanical contrivances could get out of order and 
fail to operate properly. (Tr. 145-146) If t·he valves 
on the wa,ter gl'ass was stuck or dirty, the vvater glaRs 
could show the boiler full of water, when it was, in fad, 
empty. (Tr. 146) The low water condition in the boiler 
was the result of a specific mechanical defect, or of 
criminal negligence on the part of the engineer in charge 
of engine No. 1804 on its arrival at the Denver Stati011. 
Although respondent was operating the locomotive at 
the time of the explosion under the diredion and control 
of Babcock, the hostler, it was Ba'hcock 's duty to check 
the water in the locomotive and he was in fact in chaflge 
of the locomotive. Respondent testified that he was un-
der no duty to check the water in the boiler. (Tr. 423-424) 
This was the duty of Babcock, the hostler. (Tr. 225-226) 
Since the locomotive was backing prior to the explosion, 
respondent's back was turned to the water glass and 
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water co1lumn as he operated the lo-comotive south toward 
Burnham. 
A locomtive boiler does not explode except for cause 
and under circumstances such as here presented, when 
the boiler explodes, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur gives 
rise to an inference tha,t the Boiler Inspection Aet has 
been violated. 
In the case of Eker v. Pettibone, 110 Fed. (2d) 451, 
(C. C. A. 7), I<~ker was an engineer in eharge of the opera-
tion o·f a freight train consisting of an engine and 41 
cars traveling north on defendant's lines. At a point on 
the line, the engine and 16 cars derailed and Eker was 
k<illed. The derailment was occasioned by the fact that 
the pony truck (the sman wheels in front of the drivers) 
jumped the track. There was no evidence of a defect 
in the pony truck and no evidence as to why the pony 
truck jumped the track. Plaintiff relied on the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur as esbblishing a violation by de-
fendant of the Boiler Inspection Act and the Court in 
sustaining this eontention spoke as follows: 
"Defendant concedes that its duty is manda-
tory and absolute-the construction of,ten placed 
upon this Act-yet it argues there can be no recov-
ery because (1) there is no evidence of a violation 
of the Act, and (2) that even if so, it was not the 
proximate cause of decede11t's death. A study of 
the cases relied upon by both parties convinces us 
that its contention must he denied. 
The decision in Minneapolis & St. Louis R. 
R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66, 37 S. Ct. 598, 61 
L. Ed. 995, in our judgment, comes near being de-
I ,, 
~ I , 
46 
ClSIVe. There, a brakeman was wwlking along the 
top of a train of cars when the train separated 
because of the opening of a coupler on one of the 
cars, resulting in an automatic setting of the 
emergency brakes and a sudden jerk which threw 
the brakeman off the train, by which he was killed. 
It was there contended there was no evidence of 
neglect on the part of the company exeept the 
mere fact that the coupler failed to perform its 
function and, that to permit the jury to infer neg·-
ligence amounted to an application of the princi-
ple designated as res ipsa loquitur. ~With refer-
ence to this contention, and the cases cited in its 
support, the court, on page 67 of 244 U. S., 37 S. 
Ct. at page 599, 61 L. I'~d. 99'3, said: '~· .; * \Ve 
think the contention is without merit because, con-
ceding in the fullest measure the (•orrectness of 
the ruling announced in the cases relied upon to 
the effect that neg1ligence may not be inferred 
from the mere happening of an accident except 
under the most exceptional circumstances, we are 
of opinion such principle is here not controUing· 
in view ·of the positive duty imposed by the stat-
ute upon the railroad to furnish safe appliances 
for the coupling of cars. * ·x· "''' 
This court in Vigor v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry. 
Co., 7 Cir., 101 .B'. (2d) 865, had before it a case, 
.the facts of which were much l~ike .those in the 
Gotschall case. The accident was due to the fail-
ure of a car coupler to properly operate. It \Vas 
shown that it was in proper condition both before 
and after the aecideut. The court said, 101 F. 
(2d) at pag·e 868: ''' ,,, * If a coupler fails to 
function, such fact is sufficient evidence of its 
defe.ctive character regardles o.f how it functioned 
before or after sueh failure. (Oiting cases). * 
* *' 
In Anderson v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 2 Cir., 
96 F. (2d) 796, the plaintiff was killed by a train 
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on an adj,acent track while standing beside his 
engine for the purpose of .ascertaining why its 
sanding apparatus had failed to function. The 
court, on page 7'98 of 9'6 F. ( 2d) said : '* * * 
'The failure of the apparatus gave rise to .an in-
ference of some defect, and whether that infer-
ence was overcome by the defendant's explana-
tion was a question for the jury on all the evi-
dence. * * *' 
In Didinger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 6 Cir., 
3'9 F. (2d) 798, the court considered a case based 
upon Sec. 11 of the Safety Appliance Act, 45 
U.S.C.A., Sec. 11, conceming the duty of the car-
rier to equip and maintain hand 'brakes in effi-
cient eondibion. The court, on page 79'H of 39 
}1-.. (2d) said: 
'There are two recogni:wd methods of show-
ing the inefficiency of hand brake equipment. 
E:vidence may be adduced to establish some par-
ticular defee.t, or the same inefficiency may be 
established by showing a failure to function, when 
operated with due care, in the normal, natural, 
and usual manner. * * ~, 
'Assuming the proper setting of the brake, 
the fact that it did not hold demonstrates its in-
effieieney. * * *' 
Defendant seeks to distinguish the Gotschall, 
Vigor, Anderson and Didinger cases from the in-
stant one on the theory that in those cases the 
court was considering 'parts and appurtenances' 
rather than the locomotive itself. The defendant 
states its eont!:)ntion thus: '* * * The cases 
cited have to do with couplers, hand brakes ancl 
those attachments and devices which clearly fall 
within the description of parts and appurten-
ances, but the pony-trucks (for the purpose of the 
rule under discussion) must be treated as the en-
gine itself. If plaintiff's eontention is correet it 
,, 
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might be sa·id that the derailment of an engine 
justifies the inference that its parts and appurtell-
ances are not in working order, and it is our con-
tention that the statute cannot be so construed. 
* * *' 
We do not believe there is any logical basis 
for such distinction. The Act is applicable to 
'the locomotive, its bo-iler, tender and all parts 
and appurtenances thereof,' and we do not sec 
how i·t can make any difference whether the defect 
is in the locomotive itself or in one of its parts or 
a.ppurtenances. If the mere failure of a coupler 
to open, as was the situation in the Gotschall and 
Vigor cases; the failure of an apparatus to func-
tion, as in the Anderson case, or the failure of a 
brake to hold, as in the Didinger case, is suffi-
cient to create an inference or make a prima facie 
case of a violation of the Act, we can see no rea-
son why the failure of the pony-truck to function 
does not likewise create an inference of a viola-
tion of the statutory duty, and this, irrespective 
as to whether the pony-truck he considered as a 
component part of the locomotive itself or merely 
an appurtenance thereof. The function of the 
pony-truck is to pilot and guide the engine along 
the rails. It failed to perform that function, and 
thus failing, caused the engine to leave the rails 
and turn over. VV'C think there can be little, if 
any, doubt that the fact that the pony-truck left 
the rails for no apparent reason, raises an infer-
ence which ~was sufficient to take the case to the 
jury. Especially is this true in view of the fact 
that a thorough search and investigation was 
made, but without success as to what did or might 
have caused the pony-truck to jump the track.'' 
Eker v. Petti·b011.e, 
110 Fed. (2d) 451 (C. C. A. 7). 
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Anderson v. B. & 0. (C. C. A. 2), 9·6 Feel. (2d) 796, 
is the second appeal in the case of Anderson v. B. & 0., 
89 Fed. (2d) 629. A sanding device on a locomo·tive 
failed to operate properly and in endeavoring to repair 
the sander, p1laintiff's intestate, the fireman was run over 
and killed by a train pass·ing on an adjoining traek. 
Plaintiff claimed that the sander was not maintained in 
a safe condit·ion as required by the Boiler Inspection Aet 
and that he was therefore entitled to recover for a viola-
tion of the Boiler Inspection Act. The Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that the failure of the apparatus to func-
tion properly gave rise to an inference of some defe0t 
and whether or not the defendant overcame this infer-
ence was a question for the jury. rrhe Court spoke as 
follows: 
''Although upon the printed record Shire's 
testimony is less penmasive than that of the de-
fendant'·s witnesses, the weight to be ac0orded it 
was for the jury. We cannot accept the appel-
lant's contention that there is no more than a 
scintilla of evidence to support the plaintiff's case. 
The sufficiency of the defendant '·s explanation of 
the failure of the sanders depends upon the truth-
fulness of Cobb's testimony concerning the test 
he made before the train started, the snfficienry 
of the air pressure when he opened the valves at 
Stanley, and what he did to get the apparatus to 
function properly after the train stalled. He was 
an interested witness and what measure of 
credence should be given to his testiwony was a 
jury question. Texas & Pac. R Co. v. Carlin, 189 
U. S. 354, 361, 23 S. Ot. 585, 47 L. Ed. 849; Vo·lk-
mar v. Manhattan R. Co., 134 N. Y. 418, 422, 31 
N. E. 870, 30 Am. St. Rep. 678. Acceptance or 
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rejection of the opmwns of the expert witnesses 
was also for the jury. The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 
110, 131, 17 S. Ot. 510, 41 L. Ed. 9::n; Dayton 
Power & L,ight Co. v. Commission, 292 U. S. 290, 
299, 54 S. Ct. 647, 78 L. Ed. 12G7. Cobb testified 
tha.t he did not think he was getting any sand 
through the pipes after leaving Starlley. It is 
diff.icult to understand how the wet sand plugs 
could have formed between the starting of the 
train and its arrival at Stanley, for during that 
half hour the sanders had not been used at all 
and no sand should have been coming through the 
pipes. The failure of the appara.fus gave rise to 
a11 inj'errnce of some defect, and uJ'lwther that in-
ference was overcome by the defend,ant 's explana-
tion 'Was a question j;or the jury on all the evi-
dence. Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Cieehowski, 2 
Cir., 10 F. (2d) 82, 84. See, also, Sweeney v. 
Erving, 228 U. S. 23:3, 240, 3:3 S. Ct. 41<6, 57 L. u~d. 
815, Ann. Cas. 1 ~n4D, 905.'' 
Other cases applying this principle are: 
P,it.cairn v. Perry, 122 Fed. (2d) 881; 
Hmuard v. Penn. Ry., 1812 N. F~. 66:1; 
Central Ry. of N.J. v. Pelus, 286 ]~ed. 661 ; 
Mctz 1J. Southern Pac., 
51 Adv. Cal. App. 4m, 124 Pac. (2d) 
670. 
Appellants made no attempt to rebut the inference 
of defect arising from the happening· of the accident. 
They made no attempt to prove that the appliances for 
determining the water level were in a fit and proper con-
dition either before or after the happening of the acci-
dent in question, but proceeded upon the theory that it 
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IS presumed that their employees m charge of the en-
gine were guilty of criminal negligence in allowing the 
water to reach a point 27 inches below the crown sheet 
prior to the time that respondent boarded the looomotive. 
Their failure to rebut the inference of a defect leaves 
the case with au inference of defect arising from the 
failure of the apparatus to operate properly with no evi-
d.ence what;,;oever to show or prove that the apparatus 
was not defective. 
In the ca;,;es cited by appellants it was shown that the 
injuries to plaintiff resulted from the misplacing of an 
appliance on the locomotive or the presence of some for-
eign substance on the locomotive. In none of the cases was 
there a mechanical failure completely unexplained. The 
vice of appellants' argument is that they blandly assume 
that, in the absence of evidence specifically disclosing the 
reason for the low water in the engine of No. 1804, we 
must assume that aU of the parts and appurtenances of 
the locomotive were in proper eondition and that the low 
water resulted because of the failure of the engineer to 
use apparatus or appurtenances in all respects proper 
and safe. If such were the ease, it would have been a 
very easy matter to have called the engineer and fire-
man to the witness stanld and tlm:-; produce testimony 
that these appurtenanrm; were in proper condition. The 
reason they were not so oalled was because these gentle-
men would perhaps have testified that they were not 
negligent to the extent charged by appellants. 
p .. , 
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Boilers do not explode except for cause. When they 
do explode it is ordinarily within the power of the rail-
road company to determine the cause of the explosion. 
The Boiler Inspection Act imposes upon the railroad 
company an absolute duty to keep its boilers in safe 
condition. Once a plaintiff has proven that his injury 
is proximately caused by reason of the boiler exploding, 
an inference of ne·gligenee arises which the defendant 
must rebut in order to prevail. 
In the case of a violation of any of the Safet,v Ap-
pliance Acts, failure of the appliam~e to work gives rise 
to an inference of uegEgenee. This is true in the case 
of a violation hy the railroad of the so-called "coupler 
provisions'' of the Safety Appliance Act, 4-5 U.'S.C.A. 
Section 2. 
See; 
Minn. & St. Louis v. Gotschall, 
244 U. S. 8616, 61 L. Ed. 991; 
Vigor v. C. ((!; 0. Ry., 101 Fed. (2d) 865. 
It is also tnw in the event an aecideut occurs by 
reason of the failure of a hand brake to operate efficiently 
as required by 43 U.S.C.A. Section 11. 
See: 
JJidiu.r;er 1/'. Penn. Ry. iJ9 Fed. ( :2d) 79H; 
C. & 0. Ry. v. Gowan, 65 Fed. (2d) 260; 
Detroit fly. Co. v. Hahn, 47 Fed. (2d) 59; 
Wild v. Pitca·irn, 149 S. vV. (2d) 800 Mo. 
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In the case of Wild v. Pitcairn, supra, the Court in 
holding that evidence of failure to operate without proof 
of defect was sufficient, spoke as follows: 
"Appellants concede that it was unnecessary 
to prove negligenc~e, bu.t conter1d that there was a 
f<rilu.re of proof becau,se no defect 'in the hand-
brake was shown. Respondent contends that he 
was not 1·equired to prove any rnechanical defect, 
but only that the handbrake wa.s inefficient and 
that such fact ll'as shown by proof that it oper-
ated ineffic,iently. The petition did not allege that 
the brake was defective; only that it was ineffi-
cient. Respondent's proof was to the effect that 
while he was attempting to tnrn the brake wheel 
in the customary manner it suddenly spun around 
in the opposite directim1 and that such occurrence 
would not have taken place if the brake had been 
efficient.'' 
It was held in B. cf!; 0. 'V. Groeger, supra, with respect 
to a boiler explosion that an inference of defect arises 
from the failure of .an appliance to operate. In the 
Groeger case the Supreme Court reversed the lower 
Court's judgment for plaint~ff fm the reason that the 
jury had been instructed that the failure to supply the 
locomotive with fusible plugs rendered the locomo-
tive unsafe. Tlhe Court points out that the ultimate 
1sue was whether or not the locomotive was safe. 
The be·st evidenec that the locomotive boiler was unsafe 
was the fact that it exploded and in the absence of 
explanation such evidence is sufficient to permit recovery 
for a violation ,of the Boiler Inspection Act. 
54 
In the absence of evidence to rebut the inference of 
defect, the record in this case establishes a violation 
of the Boiler Inspection Act as a matter of law. An 
instructed verdict on this issue would have been fully 
supported by the evidence. 
III. 
The violation of the Boiler Inspection Act was the proxi-
mate cause of the accident and of the injuries to re-
spondent. 
Locomotive No. 1804 was in charge of Babcock, the 
hostler. It was not part of respondent's duties to de-
termine the water level in the boiler. He testified as fol-
lows: 
"(~. And as you use your water, you have to put 
water into the boiler either through the pump 
or the inspirator'! 
A. Yes sir, if you use it enough. 
Q. If you use it enough 'I 
A. Yes sir. 
(~. Well, of -course, it is your business to deter-
mine where-how much water you are using, 
isn't it? 
A. Yes sir. 
(l. That's the reason they have those appliances 
on there, isn't it? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. T.o determine where your level is? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And it's your business to find that out, isn't 
iU 
A. Mr. Babcock's business to find that out. 
Q. That wasn't your business~ 
A. No ·sir. 
(~. It wasn't your business at all to look at that 
Water gauge~ 
A. No sir, I would say no. 
Q. You would say no. Now, Mr. Ehalt, you know 
that if this water gets down below the crown 
sheet in the locomotive, that the further down 
it gets something is likely to happen, don't 
you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And, of course, you know y.ou are on the loco-
motive? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you know as far as yon are concerned 
you are pretty much interested in your own 
safety, aren't you~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Now, you didn't look at the water this day, 
did you~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. At any time~ 
A. No sir." 
(Tr. 423-424--Respondent) 
There is no evidence that any breach of duty on 
the part of respondent contributed to cause this accident. 
1Vhere there is a violation of the Boiler Inspection 
Act, contributory negligence and assumption of risk are 
eliminated as defenses. 45 U.S.C.A. Sections 53 and 54. 
If the violation of the Act is a proximate cause of 
the accident, plaintiff is entitled to recover. 
In the cases cited by appellants in this portion of 
their brief, the Courts applied the well known primary 
evidence rule. If the negligence of defendant gives rise 
to a condition, and the actual proximate cause of the 
injury is the violation by the plaintiff of a duty imposed 
upon him by a rule of the employer, the final negligence 
of the plaintiff is looked upon as the sole cause of the 
accident. In these cases, the negligence charged against 
the railroad company is ordinarily the violation by an-
other employee of the same duty imposed upon plaintiff 
by a rule of the company. 
\iVhere the violation of the Boiler Inspection Act, or 
the particular Safety Appliance Act involved, continues 
as a proximate cause of the accident and is more than 
a conditi,on, recovery is allowed even though plaintiff is 
contributorily negligent. 
Louisville & Nashville Ry. r. Layton, 
61 L. Ed. 931 ; 
Alcorn v .. lito. Pac. Ry. 63 S. W. (2) 55, 
( certiomri denied) 243 U. S. 617, 
78 L. Ed. 602; 
Stewart v. Wabash Ry, 182 N. \V. 496; 
[( eenan v. Director General, 285 Fed. 286. 
57 
The same proposition was disposed of in Anderson 
v. B. &- 0. Ry., 89 ]'ed. (2d) 629, as follows: 
',,rrhe seeond question is more difficult, name-
ily, whether H1e defect in the sanders, which the 
jury mig-ht have found to exist, was the proximaJe 
cause of Anderson's death. An employee cannot 
recover for a violation of the statutory duty to 
provide safety appliances, such as the Boiler In-
spection Act requires, unless the failure to com-
ply with the statute is a proximate cause of the 
accident which results in his injury; if it merely 
creates a condition or situation in which the ac-
cident happens from other causes, there is no 
liability. But, if a fai·lure to comply with the re-
quirements of the act is a proximate cause of the 
accident, resulting in injury to the employe while' 
in the discharge of his duty, he can reeover even 
though not engaged in an operation in which 
the safety applianres are specifically designed 
to furnish him protection. All this 'v•as authori-
tatively settled in Davis v. \Volfe, 26:3 U. S. 
239, 24:3, 44 S. Ct. 64, 68 L. FJcl. 284. See, also, 
Swinson v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. Go, 294 
US 52~), 55 S. Ct. 517, 79 L. Ed. 1041, 96 A. L .. R. 
113G. ·whether in a given case the statutory viola-
tion is to be de·erned the prox·imate cause, or mere-
ly a condition, of the accident is often a trouble-
some problem, and it is imposible to harmonize 
all of the many decisions on the suhjeet. The de-
fendant argues that Anderson's own act iu plar-
ing himself in a position of danger where he would 
be strnek by the l<Jrie engine was the proximate 
cause of his death, and the defect in the sanders 
only a remote cause or condition of the ac:cident. 
But the jury might reasonably find from the evi-
dence that he had taken thi·s position in an effort 
to remedy the defect and get the sand to flow be-
fore his slowly moving train should come to a 
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complete stop, and that his conduct was a normal 
reaction to the stimulus of a situation created by 
the defendant's v·iolation of its statutory duty. 
Granting that he was negligent in not observing 
the approaching engine, his contributory negli-
gence does not preelude recovery in an action 
based on violation of the statutory duty, unless 
his act can be demed a new and superseding cause 
of the accident. It is not considered as such when 
it is a norma!l reaction to the situation created by 
the defendant's wrong. New York Cent. R. C~. 
v. Brown, 63 F. (2d) 657. (C. C. A. 6) certiorari 
denied 2~JO U. S. 634, 54 S. Gt. 52, 78 L. Ed. 551; 
Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. Co. v Goldhammer, 
79 ]'. ('2d) 27'2 (C. C. A. 8), certiorari denied 296 
U. S. 6515, 56 S. Ct. 382, 80 L. I1Jd. 467; Phillabaum 
v. Lake Erie & \V. R. Co., 3f.5 Ill. 131, 145 N. E. 
806; American La\v Institute, Restatement, 
Torts, Sec 443. The case of Reetz v. Chicago & 
E. R Co., 46 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 6), is distin-
guishable on its facts from the case at bar, and 
was said in the Brown Case, supra, not to confliet 
with the rule of causation there applied. Under 
this rule we think the isue of proximate cause 
should have been submited to the jury. Min-
neapolis, ete., Ry. Co. v. Goneau, 269 U. S. 406, 
46 S. Ct. 12~J, 70 L. Ed. 335, supports this view. 
There a traiu 'broke in two upon a bridge, due to 
a defective coupling·. A brakeman attempted to 
lift the coupler into operative position, and while 
so doing lost his balanee and fell from the bridge. 
It was held that there wa·s substaut,ial evidence 
that the defective coupler was a proximate cause 
o.f the aceident and that the case was rightly sub-
mitted to the jury.'' 
Since respondent was under no duty to contro1 the 
water level in the boiler of engine No. 1B04, and since 
this duty was imposed upon Babcock, the hostler, the 
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respondent's acts in no way ·contributed to cause the ac-
cident. In any ev.ent, any failure on plaintiff's part was 
but ·contributory negligence not a defense to an action 
predicated upon the Boiler Inspection Act. 
IV. 
There was no error in the instructions to the Jury. 
On pages 8 and 9 of their brief, appellants list the 
instruetions complained of by them. 
Requested instruction No. l (Tr. 7:36); requested in-
struction No. 2 (Tr. 737); and reque::;ted instruetion No. 
4 rrr. 737) were instructions callillg for a directed ver-
dict in favor of appel'lants ancl were properly refused. 
Requested instruction No.3 (Tr. 737) related to the 
question of inspection of the locomotive and had to do 
with an issue not raised at the trial and one upon which 
no evidence was introduced. Therefore it was properly 
refused. 
Instruction No.4, as given, (Tr. 730) was in all re-
spects a correct statement of the law. 
Instruction No. 6, as given by the Court, (Tr. 731) 
was also in all respec•ts correct and proper. It told the 
jury that the engineer and hostler were vice principals 
of appeHants and that their negligence was chargeable 
to appellants. This was in all respe•cts a correct state-
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ment of the law. In addition, even though these gentle-
men were not negligent, proof of the explosion of the 
boiler entitled plaintiff to recover as a matter of law. 
Since a violation of the Boiler Inspection Act constitute·s 
neglligence within the meaning of the Federa1. Employers 
Liaibility Act, the jury was not told that plaintiff could 
recover upon proof of negligence without more, but was 
only instructed that negligence resulting in a violation of 
the Boiler Inspection Act, was negligence for which ap-
pellants would be responsible. The instrurtions read as 
a who:Ie, clearly stated that plaintiff could only recover 
in the event that he proved that locomotive No. 1804 was 
in an unsafe and improper condition at the time he 
boarded it. 
See instruction No.5, as given, (Tr. 7i30) and jnstruc-
tion No.7, as given (Tr. 731). 
Defendants' requested instruction No. 3 ('rr. 138) 
was properly refused. It dealt with the question of con-
tributory negligence, not an issue in the case. 
Defendants requested instruction No. 6 (rrr. 738) 
was properly refused. The question of the uuty of plain-
tiff~ at the time he took charge of the engine was one of 
the issues in the case upon which the evidence conflicted. 
Plaintiff testified that he was under no duty whatsoever 
to determine the water level in the boiler and contribu-
tory negligence was not an issue. 
Appellants' instruction No·. 13, (Tr. 741) was prop-
erly refused. Even though plaintiff failed to discharge 
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duties imposed upon him and his act was a proximate 
cause of the accident, unless it can be said to be the sole 
cause, the condition of the looomotive at the time it ar-
rived at the station in Denver continued to be a proxi-
mate cause of the accident. 
See cases cited in the preceding portions of this 
brief. 
Instruction No. 10, as given, (Tr. 7:33) is as follows: 
"If yon fhul by a prepondermwe of the evi-
dence that the Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, you 
must not in aseeriaiuing the amount resort to 
the pooling plan or tiCheme \Yhi('h haB Bometimes 
been adopted hy juries for fixing· such amount. 
The plan or s<'heme is \\·here eaeh juror writes the 
amouut to whieh he eonsiders the Plaintiff is en-
(•ntitled, and the amotmts so written are added 
together and the total is divided by eight. rrhis 
is a scheme .of ehance, and no element of chance 
may enter into your verdict or iuto the determin-
ation of any question neces·sary thereto; but if 
yon find honest eli ffcreuees of opinions existing 
in your ranks, you may add up the various 
amounts to whidt y.on severally believe the Plaiu-
tiff is entitled and divide so as to arrive at an 
average of your differenee; and after you have 
arrived at such an average, you may use that 
average as a basis for further determination, 
provided you have not agreed in advance that the 
figure arrived at is to he the verdict.'' 
Jt was in all respects proper. The jury was fully 
instructed that it could not arrive at a verdict by means 
of chance but that it could add up the amounts which the 
jurors severally believed plaintiff was entitled to recover, 
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arrive at an average of these amounts, and use such 
average as a basis for future discussion. 1Since this 
cause was tried in Utah, and since the manner in whieh 
the jury arrived at a verdict is a question of procedure, 
Utah law would govern. 
See: 
King u. Schumacker, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 172, 
89 P. (2d) 466, cert. den. 308 U. S. 593, 
84 L. Ed. 496; 
Shmcalter u. vVestern Pac., 
16 Cal. (~d) 4GO; lOG Pac. (2d) 895. 
Appellants cite three Utah cases to support their 
contention that instruction NQ. 10 is erroneous. They 
are-
Wright v. Un,ion Pacific, 
22 Utah :-!38; (12 Pae. 317; 
Larnbourne v. II alfin, 
23 Utah 389; 65 Pac. 206; 
Pence v. Cal. M. Co., 
27 Utah 378; 75 Pa(~. 9:-l4. 
In the \Yright and Lambourne eases, affidavits of 
the jurors proved that they had agreed to add up their 
respective estimates of the amount of damages to be 
awarded, divide the sum by the number of jurors and 
abide by the resulting amount. This, of course, was 
error. 
In the Pence case, the same procedure was followed 
but the jurors did not agree in advance to accept the 
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result reaehed as their verdid. Therefore the procedure 
·Of the jury was in all respects proper and the verdict 
was sustained. 
The instruction given m the case at bar 1s fully 
justified by the Penee case. 
In that case the Court states the rule as follows: 
"Under the provi::;ions of the statute a ver-
dict ,of a jury may be set aside and a new trial 
granted in any ease where such verdiet \Yas found 
'by a resort to the Jetermination of chance,' and 
'suoh misconduct may be proved :by the affidavit 
of any one of the jurors.' The 'determination of 
{'hance,' however, to have such effect, must have 
heen the means of indm·ing one or more jumrs 
to assent to the verdiet. It follows that the mere 
fact that the jury, in a given case, may, during 
their deliberations, have resorted to chance to 
ohiaiu an average sum, will not vitiate their ver-
dict, if, not with::; tanding such sum, they there-
after continue to deliberate in good faith, and 
finally arrive at their verdiet as a result of fair 
and houest deliberation, free of any inducement 
from the resort to chance. The burden of proof 
to show that the assent of one or more jurors was 
obtained to the venliet by the determination of 
chance, or that it was in faet a ehance verdict, is 
upon him who assails the verdict.'' 
Utah law in this regard is in all respects in conform-
ity with the law of other jurisdictrions. 
'' Q1wtient Verdicts or Averaging Est·imates 
of Jurors. In aeeordance with the rule that the 
verdiet is vitiated if it is arrived at by chance 
or lot, it is generally held, although there is some 
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authority to the contrary, that the verdict will be 
set aside as a quotient verdict if the juy, for the 
purpose of arriving at their verdict, agree that 
each member shall set down a sum which he thinks 
is right, that the aggregate will he divided by 
twelve, and that they will he bound by the result, 
whatever it may be, and the qotient returned as 
their verdict. It is sufficient to vitiate the verdict 
under this rule that .only the greater number of 
the jurors entered into such an agreement; and, 
even though there is no agreement, the verdict is 
vitiated if some of the jurors consider themselves 
bound to abide by the result of taking the average, 
and act accordingly. If, however, there is no 
agreement that the average estimate shall be 
binding, and the averaging of estimates is done 
merely for the purpose of arriving at a working 
basis which the jurors are to he free to accept or 
reject as they see fit, a verdict, to which the jurors 
subsequently agree, is binding, whether it be for 
a sum which is the average of the amounts fixed 
by the individual jurors, or for some other 
amount. \iVhen there is nothing to show the con-
trary, it will he presumed that there was no illegal 
agreement to be bound by the average of the 
individual estimates; and a verdict will not be 
vitiated as a quotient verdict if it does not affirma-
tiYely appear that the jurors hound themselves, in 
advauee, to arrive at a verdict in that manner, and 
that they in fact did so. If the agreement to 
abide by the quotient verdict is repudiated, a 
verdict subsequently reached as the result of prop-
er deliberation is valid; hut the illegality of a 
quotient verdict cannot be cured by its subsequent 
adoption or ratification, or a subsequent agree-
ment to a slightly different verdict, if the agree-
ment made in advance entered into or induced the 
result.'' 
G4 Corp .. Juris., pg. 1035-Trial Par. s:n. 
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In the case at bar, there is no evidence whatsoever 
that the jury, in fact, added up their estimates of the 
amount of recovery and divided by the number of jurors 
in order to arrive at a verdict. 
Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Ryarn, 30 Pac. 108, cited 
by appellants on page 44 of their brief, was a condemna-
tion suit in which experts had testified respecting the 
value of land. The Court suggested to the jury that 
they could add up the amount of the estimates made by 
the various experts and divide by the number of experts 
and reach a verdict in that manner. This, of court>e, was 
clear error. 
For a general dis-cussion on this subject see note 
in 52 A. L. Rat page 41. 
The instructions given were therefore in all respects 
proper. 
CONCLUSION 
It is therefore respectfully requested that the verdict 
and judgment herein in favor of respondent be affirmed 
by this Court. 
RAWLINGS, wALLACE & BLACK, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
